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Case No, 20779 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
A R G U M E N T 
Reasons for the Delay 
The Brief of Respondent introduces considerable confu-
sion into this appeal by failing to distinguish between two, 
legally distinct, proceedings: the instant criminal prosecu-
tion, State v. Ossana; and Cannon v. Keller, the petition for 
extraordinary relief which was brought in the district court 
and proceeded to this Court while the criminal prosecution 
was stayed in the circuit court. Much of this confusion 
originates in the Record below where the deputy county attor-
ney also failed to maintain the distinction between the two 
actions, even producing a hybrid, illegitimate off-spring 
which he called, "State of Utah v. Thomas Ossana; Judge Larry 
Keller." See, unsigned document titled, "Order Remanding 
Case to Circuit Court for Preliminary Hearing." (R-24)(Appx. 
B.) The Brief of Respondent exploits this confusion to 
achieve a transubstantiation of delay clearly caused by deli-
berate and unjustified action of the prosecutor into delay 
"affirmatively caused by the defendant." 
All of the delay in the criminal proceeding, from Novem-
ber 12, 1980, until February 7, 1985, is directly attribut-
able to the prosecutor who obtained the order, ex parte, from 
the district court in Cannon v. Keller staying all proceed-
ings in the criminal case in the circuit court until Cannon 
v. Keller was resolved. (R-27)(Appx. A). That stay order 
was not lifted until January 31, 1985. (R-16). 
The State in its Brief of Respondent accepts responsibi-
lity for only five weeks of this delay, the period from 
November 12, 1980, to December 15, 1980. (Resp. Br. 6-7). 
The period from December 15, 1980, to February 24, 1982, 
which Respondent desianates as "Period Two," is described c 
Respondent as unexplained delav, attributable to neitnev 
party because "the record is silent as to t;he reason for tn:s 
unusual delay." (Resp. Br. 7). The record is not silent: as 
to cause of the delay in the criminal proceeding during this 
period. The record clearly shows that the order (R-27, Appx. 
A) which the prosecutor obtained, staying all proceedings in 
the criminal case in the circuit court, was still in effect. 
The record included in this appeal ijs silent as to what was 
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transpiring during this period in the collateral proceeding 
for extraordinary relief in the district court. However, the 
delay in the criminal case during this period is directly 
attributable to the stay order obtained by the prosecutor. 
If something occurred in the collateral civil proceeding 
which somehow lifts the responsibility from the prosecutor 
for causing the delay in the criminal proceeding during this 
period, it should have been included in the record. A 
silent record cannot assist the State in explaining what the 
record does show to be delay directly and deliberately caused 
by the prosecutor. 
The Brief of Respondent attributes the remainder of the 
period, during which the criminal proceeding was stayed in 
the circuit court, March 1, 1982, through February 7, 1985, 
to affirmative action of the defendant because "the defendant 
obtained an order from the district court staying circuit 
court proceedings for a second time (R. 23)," (Resp. Br. 7), 
and because the defendant appealed the ruling of the district 
court in the collateral proceeding for extraordinary relief 
to this Court. (Resp. Br. 8). The defendant never obtained 
an order staying the criminal proceedings in the circuit 
The district court below in this criminal case did judicially 
notice the record from the collateral case, Cannon v. Keller, 
Misc. No. M-80-88. (Trans. April 22, 1985, p. 5, R-207) . However, 
that portion of the record was not designated by either party to 
this appeal. 
court. The order referred to by Respondent (R. 23)(Appx. C) 
stated: 
The order captioned, "State of Utah, Plaintiff, vs. 
Thomas Ossana, Judge Larry Keller, 5th Circuit 
Court, Defendants, Order Remanding Case to Circuit 
Court for Preliminary Hearing, Civil No. M-80-88," 
if any such order did issue, is hereby stayed pend-
ing a hearing on Respondents' previously filed 
motions for rehearing, and Respondents' motions for 
rehearing are hereby set for hearing before this 
Court on 10[th] day of March, 1982, at the hour of 
9:00 a.m. 
(R-23)(Appx. C). 
This order was obtained, in the collateral proceeding 
for extraordinary relief, on motion of the defendant here, 
merely to stay any effect of that most peculiar, unsigned, 
document purporting to be an order "remanding" the criminal 
case to the circuit court for preliminary hearing without the 
discovery ordered for the reason that the defendant, and the 
other respondent, The Honorable Larry Keller, had not been 
heard on the pending motions in the collateral civil proceed-
ing m the district court. (Ibid Verified Motion, Cannon v. 
Keller, vise. No. M-80-88, Acpx. D). Assuming that the stayed 
order had issued and was a valid order, which the record does 
not support, staying that order until the scheduled hearing 
would have the indirect effect of delaying the criminal 
proceeding for a set period of ten days. Assuming that 
shifts the cause of delay, the defendant cannot be faulted 
for asserting a right: to contest what proved to be a wrongful 
infringement: of his discovery rights. What is more, it is 
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unlikely that the other respondent, Judge Keller, would not 
have acted if the defendant had refrained since the district 
court decision (R-25) held that circuit courts did not have 
jurisdiction to issue orders pertaining to discovery and both 
respondents had motions for rehearing pending. (Ibid.) 
Although the record in the instant case does not show 
it, perhaps this Court can determine from judicial notice of 
its own record in Cannon v. Keller, Sup. Ct. No. 1844-1, that 
the defendant here did appeal the second decision of the 
district court in the collateral civil case to this Court and 
conclude that, since the criminal case had been stayed until 
conclusion of the civil case, the appeal indirectly delayed 
the criminal case. But, to hold that such an appeal in the 
collateral civil case constitutes affirmative delay of the 
criminal case attributable to the defendant and a waiver of 
his right to speedy trial would require the defendant to 
trade his discovery rights in order to obtain his right to a 
speedy trial. 
Again, the delay in the criminal proceeding was directly 
the result of the prosecutor obtaining an order staying the 
proceedings in the circuit court while he litigated the 
discovery order. It is true that the delay would have been 
shortened had the defendant not defended the discovery order 
in the collateral civil proceeding and the respondent Circuit 
Court Judge had also not defended that court's jurisdiction. 
It is also true that the defendant could have waived his 
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preliminary hearing at the initial appearance before the 
magistrate and been brought to trial in a very short time. 
However, there is no authority for the proposition that the 
specific constitutional right to a speedy trial must be 
purchased with the relinquishment of other procedural rights, 
not to mention the relinquishment of a considerable portion 
of the jurisdiction of the circuit court. 
Perhaps, if a defendant does indicate a desire to delay 
a criminal proceeding pending other litigation, as the defen-
dant did in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514- (1972), or engages 
in dilatory tactics in a collateral proceeding, that should 
be a factor in applying the balancing test. However, in this 
case, the prosecutor unilaterally brought the collateral 
action against the defendant and the Circuit Court Judge, and 
obtained the order staying the criminal proceedings ex parte. 
The defendant did resist the prosecutor's request for extra-
ordinary relief and did appeal the erroneous ruling of the 
district court to this Court, but that hardly can be con-
strued as consenting to the litigation or the resulting delay 
in the criminal proceeding. 
It is submitted that the entire fifty-one month period 
of delay caused directly by the prosecutor staying the crimi-
nal proceeding must be attributed to the State. 
The Brief of Respondent makes no serious effort to 
justify the actions of the deputy county attorney in bringing 
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and pursuing the collateral civil litigation. That brief 
even dismisses the defendant's arguments concerning the 
State's lack of legitimate interest and the alternatives the 
prosecutor had to protect any claimed interest of the State 
without delaying the criminal proceeding (See App. Br, 15-16) 
as being of only "slight relevance to the speedy trial 
issue." (Resp. Br. 10, n.2). However, the State can hardly 
argue that the State was reasonably seeking interlocutory 
relief to protect the interests of society (see, Resp. Br. 
10) when it was clear that the State had no real interest, 
and any interest it might have had could be more effectively 
protected by other means which would not infringe the speedy 
trial right of the defendant. 
Assertion of Right 
The Brief of Respondent asserts that the defendant's 
failure to assert the right to speedy trial should weigh 
heavily against the defendant because the defendant never 
objected to any continuance. (Resp. Br. 15). It must be 
noticed that the defendant had no opportunity to object to 
the continuance without date resulting from the stay order 
which the prosecutor obtain £x parte. This was not a 
situation as in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), where 
the defendant stood silent, in apparent agreement, while the 
prosecutor in open court requested and obtained numerous 
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continuances of trial dates to await the outcome of a co-
defendant ' s tri al. 
The only continuances which occurred while defendant was 
present were the first one from November 18, 1980, to Decem-
ber 16, 1980, which defendant did not oppose, and the last 
continuance from February 7, 1985, to February 14-, 1985, 
which the court ordered to allow the State to furnish the 
ordered discovery. (R-5). The last continuance was cer-
tainly opposed by the defendant who made a motion to dismiss 
because the discovery had not been completed by the prosecu-
tion despite this Court's upholding the validity of the 
discovery order months before and because the defendant was 
denied a prompt preliminary hearing. (Agreed Statement 
Supplementing Record). 
As argued in detail in the Brief of Appellant (App. Br. 
18-19), the defendant was precluded from demanding a trial 
during the delay before preliminary hearing caused by the 
stay order and by the denial of prompt preliminary hearing, 
and the defendant did assert his speedy trial right at the 
first opportunity. 
Prejudice 
The Brief of Respondent interprets Barker v. Wingo, 407 
U.S. 514 (1972) as suggesting that a finding of specific 
prejudice to the defendant's defense is necessary to warrant 
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dismissal for denial of the right to speedy trial. (Resp. 
Br. 16). However, the United States Supreme Court has held 
that such an interpretation of Barker was "fundamental 
error." Moore v. Arizona, 414. U.S. 25, 26 (1973). As the 
authorities cited in the Brief of Appellant show (App. Br. 
21), the prejudice involved in the speedy trial test is 
prejudice to the defendant which usually is separate from 
prejudice to the defense, that is, the defendant's ability to 
put on evidence exonerating himself. The defendant, as an 
accused, has a specific Sixth Amendment right to a speedy 
trial, in addition to his Fifth Amendment right to a fair 
trial, and he is entitled to a speedy trial whether or not he 
has a defense. 
The extent of the prejudice is a factor, to be balanced 
with the other factors in the Barker test. Moore v. Arizona, 
supra. Thus, where the delay is relatively short, or where 
there is justification for the delay, or where the defendant 
also wishes the delay, it might take a showing of specific 
prejudice in a particular case in order to show that the 
defendant's rights were infringed. However, where the delay 
is long enough, prejudice is presumed from the inordinate 
delay itself since the infringement of speedy trial right is 
clear. See, e.g. United States v. Machine, 486 F.2d 750, 753 
(7th Cir. 1973). 
Since the defendant's right to a speedy trial was 
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infringed, he was inevitably prejudiced to some extent, see 
Moore v. Arizona, supra, 414 U.S. at 26-27, and since there 
is no showing that the delay was reasonably necessary and no 
showing that the defendant waived his speedy trial right, 
dismissal is the only remedy, regardless of the merits of 
defendant's case at trial. 
Denial of Prompt Preliminary Hearing 
The Brief of Respondent argues that the time limitations 
of Rule 7(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, do not apply 
because of the provision within the rule which provides that 
"these time periods may be extended by the magistrate for 
good cause." This argument overlooks the fact that the 
magistrate did not extend the time limits but ordered the 
criminal case continued without date. There is an obvious 
difference in fulfilling the purpose of the rule between 
continuing a case for a specified time period and continuing 
a case without date. 
The State's argument also begs the question by assuming 
that allowing collateral litigation in this case was "good 
cause shown." As the defendant has shown (App. Br. 15-16) 
the collateral litigation was not necessary to protect any 
legitimate interest of the State. But even if it were, it is 
submitted that the criminal case should not have been put on 
indefinite hold, prior to preliminary hearing, while that 
collateral litigation took place. 
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The defendant did not, even by silence, consent to the 
delay caused by the stay order since it was obtained by the 
prosecutor ex parte (R-27) and the continuance without date 
was not entered in the presence of the defendant. (R-4). 
The defendant certainly did not consent to the delay by 
defending against the collateral action, (See supra pp. 35). 
Respectfully submitted this 
4th day of December, 1985. 
JQfHN D". O'CONNELL 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, JOHN D. O'CONNELL, hereby certify that four copies of the 
foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant have been delivered to the 
Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 
this dav of December, 1985. 
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TED CAHHON P O : i s 1980 
Salt Lake County Attorney -
By: MICHAEL J. CHRISTENSEN I J L U * ^ > X^^U 
Deputy County Attorney ^J^y^TStsJ M2VbJw\-
Attorney for Petitioner 
Room C-220 
Metropolitan Hall of Justice 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 363-7900 
U^W  
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
TED CANNON, * 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
Petitioner ORDER STAYING PROCEEDINGS AND 
* SETTING HEARING ON PLAINTIFF'S 
-vs- PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY WRIT 
* IN THE NATURE OF CERTIORARI 
LARRY R. KELLER, JUDGE OF AND/OR MANDAMAS 
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, * 
and THOMAS OSSANA, 
* 
Respondents. Miscellaneous No. H 3o** 8 3 
Pursuant to the Petition of Plaintiff/Petitioner, by 
and through Michael J. Christensen, Deputy County Attorney, seeking 
relief in the form of an Extraordinary Writ and Order Staying Pro-
ceedings and Execution of an Order of the Fifth Circuit Court, Judge 
Larry R. Keller presiding, and good cause appearing: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Respondents be summoned and appear before this Court 
on fT'0*\ the > y day of Ma.nWmw, 1980, at the hour of 
9.'#^ *•+* « > then and there to show cause, if any they have, why 
an Extraordinary Writ as prayed should not be granted, and 
2. That all actions now pending in the Fifth Circuit Court 
in Case No. 80-CRS-2108 be stayed and the Order of said Court be 
dated November 7, 1980, to take effect November 14, 1980, is further 
stayed pending an outcome as to the issued of said Petition. 
DATED this ' ; day of November, 1980. 
BY THE COURT: 
( < ,< ^ 
WAW mn b DISTRICT COURT JUDCE" 
TED CANNON 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
By: MICHAEL J. CHRISTENSEN 
Deputy County Attorney 
Metropolitan Law Building 
431 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 363-7900 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




JUDGE LARRY KELLER 
5TH CIRCUIT COURT 
Defendants, 
ORDER REMANDING CASE 
TO CIRCUIT COURT FOR 
PRELIMINARY HEARING 
Civil No. M-80-88 
Pursuant to a hearing on Plaintiff's Petition for Writ 
of Mandamus and a hearing conducted before this Court on November 
11, 1982, a Memorandum Decision having issued from this Court on 
December 15, 1981, and good cause appearing; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED; ADJUDGED 
1. That the criminal case Circuit Court #80 CRS 2108 
be and the same is hereby remanded to Circuit Court fot Preliminary 
Hearing, and; 
2. That the names of all confidential informants not 
be released at said Preliminary Hearing, and; 
3. That all further findings contained in this Court's 
Memorandum Decision be complied with by the Circuit Court. 
DATED this i^Say of February, p82. 
HONORABLE JUDGE DEAN E. CONDER 
Judge, Third District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Copies of the foregoing were mailed, postage prepaid to 
Judge Larry R. Keller, 250 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111, and John O'Connell, 44 Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84110 this Z^^day of February, 1932. 
JOHN 0. W'UONNM.l. 
O'CONNELL & YENGICH 
Attorney for Respondent Ossana 
44 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5835 Deputy Clerfc 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TED CANNON, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY, 
Petitioner, 
LARRY R. KELLER, JUDGE 
OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, 
and THOMAS OSSANA, 
Respondents. 
ORDER STAYING ORDER OF 
FEBRUARY 24, 1982, AND 
SETTING MATTER FOR HEARING 
Misc. No. M-80-88 
Based upon the verified motion of the attorney for 
Respondent Thomas Ossana, the order captioned, "The State of Utah, 
Plaintiff, vs. Thomas Ossana; Judge Larry Keller 5th Circuit 
Court, Defendants, Order Remanding Case to Ci rcuit Court for 
Preliminary Hearing, Civil No. M-80-88, if any such order did 
issue, it is hereby stayed pending a hearing on Respondents' 
previously filed motions for rehearing, and Respondents' motions 
for rehearing are hereby set for hearing before this Court on 
the /Q day of March, 1982, at the hour of ^''OO .m. 
DATED this / day of March, 1982. 
<—v-xl< 
JUDGE 
Third District Court 
ATTEST 
APPENDIX p 
JOHN D. O'CONNELL 
O'CONNELL & YENGICH 
Attorney for Respondent Ossana 
44 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5835 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TED CANNON, VERIFIED MOTION FOR AN 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY, : ORDER STAYING THE ORDER 
OF FEBRUARY 12, 1982, AND 
Petitioner, : SETTING MATTER FOR HEARING 
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LARRY R. KELLER, JUDGE : Misc. No. M-80-88 
OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, 
and THOMAS OSSANA, : 
Respondents. : 
COMES NOW the Respondent, THOMAS OSSANA, and moves the 
Court, ex parte, for an order staying an order purportedly issued 
by this Court on February 24, 1982, a copy of which is attached 
hereto, and setting Respondents' motions, for rehearing of the 
memorandum decision of December 15, 1980, for hearing for the 
following reasons: 
1. On February 26, 1982, counsel for Respondent Thomas 
Ossana received in the mail a document captioned, "The State of 
Utah, Plaintiff, vs. Thomas Ossana; Judge Larry Keller 5th Circuit 
Court, Defendants, Civil No. M-80-88, Order Remanding Case to 
Circuit Court for Preliminary Hearing. 
2. Counsel for Respondent Thomas Ossana has conferred 
with the Clerk of the Court and reviewed the file in this case 
and there is no record of any such order having been issued by 
this Court. 
3. The order is based upon the Memorandum Decision 
by this Court on December 15, 1980. 
Salt Likt County Utah 
MARl 1982 
4. On December 24, 1980, Respondent Thomas Ossana timely 
and duly filed a motion pursuant to Rule 59(a), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, requesting a rehearing and duly noticed up said 
motion for a hearing on January 14, 1981. That hearing date was 
stricken by the Court and counsel for Respondent Thomas Ossana, 
after conferring with the Clerk of the Court, Craig Barlow, Attorney 
for Judge Keller, and Michael Christensen, Attorney for Petitioner, 
reset the matter for April 2, 1981, That hearing date was stricken, 
to counsel's best recollection, by Michael Christensen, Attorney 
for Petitioner. The matter was not reset for hearing thereafter. 
5. On or about January 9, 1981, Respondent Judge Keller 
filed a motion to participate in hearing on Respondents1 motion 
for rehearing. 
6. The Respondents' motions have never been heard by 
this Court and Judge Keller has never been heard on the issue 
of the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court which the Memorandum 
Decision of December 15, 1980, decided. 
7. The order of February 24, 1982, if any such order 
actually issued, was obtained, ex parte, by Michael Christensen 
without notice to either of the Respondents and, to counsel's 
best knowledge and belief, without explanation to the Court that 
there were motions for rehearing pending before this Court. The 
order assumes the action here is an appeal £nd orders the case 
remanded to the Circuit Court, whereas this action was actually 
a petition for mandamus and there is no criminal case before this 
Court. 
8. At the time of the filing of the Respondents' motions 
for rehearing, it was the intention of both Respondents to appeal 
the decision of this Court to the Supreme Court in the event that 
this Court did not modify its decision upon rehearing. As this 
Court noted in the decision, it was a matter of first impression 
and the law was not clear. The decision profoundly affects the 
jurisdiction of Circuit Courts and litigation currently pending 
in the judicial system wherein evidence was obtained by the State 
- 2 -
by use of CIrcuic Courc discovery orders. 
WHEREFORE, Respondent Thomas Ossana prays that the Court 
stay the order of February 24, 1982, if any such order in fact 
exists, and set the Motions for Rehearing, previously filed, for 
hearing. 
DATED this / day of ?jarch^>982. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
7mn 
Attorney for Respondent Ossana 
County of Salt Lake ) 
COMES NOW JOHN D. O'CONNELL, being first duly sworn 
and deposes and says that he has read the foregoing and the contents 
thereof are true to his best knowledge and belief. 
DATED this ( day of 982, 
JrrAVTKTtfT T * rC0NNELL 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN^to before me this J ^ day of 
March, 1982, 
My Commission Expires: 
TAW PUBLIC 
Residing in Salt Lake Cc 
State of Utah 
. /-J^-^7 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY t h a t I mailed a copy of t h e foregoing 
V e r i f i e d Motion for Order S tay ing the Order of February 24, 1982, 
and S e t t i n g Mat ter for Hearing to Michael C h r i s t e n s e n , Deputy 
S a l t Lake County A t t o r n e y , At torney for P e t i t i o n e r , 431 South 
Third E a s t , Second F l o o r , S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111; and t o 
Craig Barlow, A s s i s t a n t At to rney Genera l , At to rney f o r Respondent 
Judge K e l l e r , 236 S t a t e C a p i t o l , S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84114, t h i s 
f day of March, 1982, 
STATt OF UTAH ) ^ 
COUNTY Of SALT LAKS ) a > 
I, f r * UNO*P*AQN€D, CtEW OF THE 0<6T*<CT 
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